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It has often been claimed, even by philosophers as early as Aristotle, 1 
that language use is conventional. What words or expressions have come 
to be about or refer to has been established by a long tradition of their use 
in speech acts so that linguistic meaning must be viewed in terms of a 
common, shared behavior pattern reinforced by what appears to be a tacit 
agreement among members of a speech community. In his early paper 
"On Referring", P.F. S t rawson 2 claimed that there were two sorts of 
conventions involved in language use: since meaningful expressions arc 
used to refer to an object or attribute a property to an object referred to, 
there are conventions for referring and conventions for ascribing or 
attributing. The meaning of an utterance was then secured by these 
conventions together with the context of utterance. The importance of the 
role that conventions play in the generation of meaning was something 
that Strawson at that time considered to have been largely ignored by 
logicians. More recently, W.V. Quine and others have challenged this 
idea and have pointed out a basic implausibility: if the utterances 
comprising a language are endowed with a meaning on the basis of an 
agreement or convention among the language users, then it would appear 
that there must have been a convening of the people who took part in the 
original agreement and, if circularity problems are to be avoided, these 
original language users must have, somehow, reached an agreement 
without the aid of any language. David Lewis in his 1969 book. 
Conventions3' fully acknowledges Quine's reservations but attempts to 
rescue the notion of a convention from the doubts of such skeptics by 
showing how a certain state of affairs can give rise to mutual expectations 
among the individuals of a population in such a fashion that a regularity 
in their behavior is reinforced and, consequently, perpetuated. This 
regularity in behavior, which occurs among a group of people who share a 
common interest in coordinating their activities, is what Lewis comes to 
mean by a 'convention'. 
' "On Propositions", 16a20-29, and 17al 6 in Aristotle: Selected Works. 
trans. Hippocrates G. Apostle and Lloyd P. Gcrson. Grinnel: Peripatetic 
Press, 1983. 
^Stawson, P.F., "On Referring", reprinted in The Philosophy of Language. 
cd. A.P. Marlinich. New York: Oxford University Press, 1985, pp. 220-235. 
Lewis, David. Conventions: A Philosophical Study. Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1969. 
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Lewis begins his exposition by presenting a series of eleven examples 
of the type of situation, what he calls a 'coordination problem', in which a 
convention may arise. Suppose, to take one of his examples, that you and I 
desire to meet at a certain time tomorrow. Let us say that the particular 
place where we meet is a matter of little consequence to us both just as 
long as we both get there at the same time. Regardless of where we both 
go, if we fail to meet, we arc both equally disappointed. In this situation, 
you and I both try to go to the same place, and for each of us where we 
finally go is dependent on our expectations about where the other person 
will go, and this expectation is in turn based on where the other person 
expects us to go. In other words, I will go to wherever I expect you to go, 
and where I expect you to go depends upon where I think you expect me 
to go. If we arc fortunate and meet at some place, we may continue this 
practice if the need to get together persists, and our mutual expectations 
about each other's expectations are strengthened after every successful 
meeting. 
The important feature of this example that it shares with Lewis's other 
examples defines the type of problem a group of individuals may face 
which Lewis wants to single out as being responsible for the genesis of 
conventions. All problems of this type involve at least two people who are 
confronted with a situation involving interdependent decision in which 
there is more than one possible standard of behavior such that uniform 
conformity to the standard is equally beneficial to all whereas any degree 
of non-conformity to the standard is equally disadvantageous to all. This 
type of problem in which agents try to coordinate their activities by 
conforming to some mutually beneficial standard or pattern of action is 
called by Lewis a coordination problem, and, by employing some of the 
concepts of game theory, Lewis is able to give a more precise definition of 
a coordination problem, a definition which, however, he must necessarily 
modify in the subsequent course of his analysis. 
In the theory of n-pcrson games, agents are construed as acting in 
such a fashion that the benefits (or payoff) to any one agent may depend 
upon, according to the situation, not only the agent's action but the actions 
of all the other agents as well. In order to present the array of information 
in a systematic fashion, game theorists construct a n-dimcnsional matrix 
(where n is the number of 'players' in the game) with dimensions p t X 
p 2 X . . . . X p n where each pj is the number of possible actions available to the 
i ( h agent. Each bounded figure in the matrix (whether a square, cube, or 
whatever) contains a sequence of n numbers which gives the payoffs to 
the n agents. Lewis considers, for the most part, only two person games 
and hence constructs mostly two-dimensional matrices consisting of p ( 
rows and p 2 columns. Any game that can be represented by a payoff 
matrix is of a type that can be considered to be on a continuum between 
two basic types of game. Games of pure conflict "can be represented by a 
payoff matrix in which the agent's payoffs (perhaps after suitable linear 
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reseating) sum to zero in every square." 4 Games of pure coordination, on 
the other hand, can be represented by a payoff matrix in which the agent's 
payoffs (again, perhaps after suitable linear rescaling 5 ) are the same in 
every square. Games of pure conflict are games where the interests of the 
agents totally conflict, and games of pure coordination are games where 
the interests of the agents perfectly coincide. Most games theorists 
actually encounter are neither of these two types but contain elements of 
both conflict and coordination. The matrix in figure 1 represents a game 
of pure conflict, while the matrix of figure 2 represents a game of pure 
coordination. Figure 3 gives a matrix that represents a game involving 
both conflict and coordination. 
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Figure 1 Figure 2 Figure 3 
'R' and *C designate row chooser and column chooser, respectively, 
and the lower left number in each square gives R's payoff while the upper 
right number is C's payoff. Each square, then, gives the payoffs to the two 
agents when R chooses the action represented by the row and C chooses 
the action represented by the column. In figure 1, each pair of numbers in 
the matrix sums to zero, and in the matrix o f figure 2 each pair of 
numbers can undergo appropriate rescaling so that the payoffs arc the 
same in every square. 
Lewis is interested in the games of coordination but is not, at least 
initially, concerned about excluding from consideration games that 
involve elements of conflict as well as of coordination. His analysis 
depends on the identification of a class of games in which coincidence of 
interests predominates. In order to specify this class, Lewis needs to 
define some other basic game theoretical terms. An equilibrium is a 
combination of actions (a square in a 2X2 matrix) such that neither 
individual, acting alone, could have, by choosing a different course o f 
action, improved his outcome (increased his payoff) . A coordination 
equilibrium is a equilibrium in which neither agent could have improved 
his outcome regardless of how either one, but not both, of them had acted 
4 Ib id . pg. 13. 
^This rescaling is accomplished, square by square, by multiplying the payoffs 
by some constant and then adding some constant to the products. 
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tliflorcntly. Finally, a proper coordination equilibrium is a coordination 
equilibrium with an outcome both agents prefer to any outcome any one 
of them could have achieved by cither one, but not both of them, acting 
differently. (The combination (i,j) is an equilibrium iff for any x and for any 
y, K's payoff at (i,j) > R"s payoff at (x,j) and C s payoff at (i,j) > C s payoff at 
(i,y). The equilibrium (i,j) is a coordination equilibrium iff for any x and for 
any y, R's payoff at (i,j) > R's payoffs at both (x,j) and (i,y) and C s payoff at 
> C s payoffs at both (x,j) and (i,y). The coordination equilibrium (i,j) is 
a proper coordination equilibrium iff for any x and for any y (not x=i and 
not y - j ) , both R's payoff at (i,j) > R's payoffs at both (x,j) and (i,y) and C s 
payoff at (i,j) > C s payoffs at both (x,j) and (i,y). 
The type of game with a significant amount of coincidence of interest 
which Lewis is concerned to single out can now be defined. A coordination 
problem is a game that has a payoff matrix with more than one proper 
coordination equilibrium. The matrix in figure 2 represents a coordination 
problem since (1,1) and (2,2) are proper coordination equilibria, but the 
matrix in figure 3 does not represent a coordination problem since it 
contains but a single proper coordination equilibrium at (1,1). This more 
precise definition captures the essence of what Lewis had less formally 
recognized in the kind of problem typified by his eleven examples. Proper 
coordination equilibria arc states of affairs both agents strive to achieve 
since they arc situations that are mutually beneficial; all other options 
available to the agents are less than desirable for all concerned. Since 
there are at least two proper coordination equilibria in any coordination 
problem, the agents can coordinate their activities in a mutually 
beneficial fashion in more than one way. There are, however, a few 
features of the former definition which arc not carried over into the formal 
definition. Lewis amends his definition later on in the text by considering 
a few important restrictions which preserve these features. 
Lewis describes the ways in which a group of individuals confronted 
with a coordination problem may in practice come to solve it (i.e., reach a 
coordination of their activities that is satisfactory to all) . Sometimes it 
happens that people just hit upon a happy combination of actions by 
mere luck, without any conscious deliberation by anyone concerning 
anybody's expectations. Most of the time, however, people confronted with 
a coordination problem cannot rely on such a fortuitous happenstance 
and arc forced into a deliberative situation in which each agent must 
divide what to do based upon what he expects the others will do. In those 
coordination problems characterized by the occurrence of a unique 
proper coordination equilibrium that is preferred by all agents to any 
other proper coordination equilibrium, the coincidence of the agent's 
actions is guaranteed so long as a knowledge of the situation is common to 
all participants and everyone is both rational and looks out for at least 
their own interests and expects everyone else to be both rational and 
concerned with at least their own interests. This type of problem is, for 
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Lewis, an example of a trivial coordination problem, and its solution does 
not exemplify the strategy which Lewis proposes as the way in which 
coordination problems are in general solved. 
When two or more agents are faced with a coordination problem, 
each of them attempts to come to some reasonable assessment of what to 
do based upon what he considers to be the most likely action the other 
one will take. It must be assumed by everyone involved that all agents are 
rational, share a common background (at least to some extent), and have 
the same inductive standards. All individuals must have knowledge of 
what the options are and be willing to bring their actions into conformity 
with a pattern the conforming to which is a coordination equilibrium on 
the condition that all others will do likewise. Under these conditions, each 
agent will try to develop expectations about the actions others will take 
using whatever information is available. If one has good reason to believe 
that certain courses of action are likely (or unlikely) to be taken by a 
certain individual(s) based upon knowledge of, say, preferences or past 
behavior, then one's expectations may be quite quite strong; in the 
absence of such information, on the other hand, they may be quite weak. 
Each agent then decides whether or not to conform to some particular 
mutually recognizable pattern of action depending upon which action will 
maximize his expected value. Given that the cost of nonconformity is 
outweighed by the benefits of achieving conformity, then the rational 
agent will opt to conform if he views the likelihood of conformity on the 
part of others to be greater than the likelihood of their nonconformity; if 
this latter condition is not the case, he will choose not to conform. 
If agents A and B are deliberating about their future course of action, 
then each will develop expectations about what the other one will do. 
What the other one will do is, however, dependent upon what he expects 
the first one to expect him to do. This expectation in turn leads to more 
and more complicated expectations involving the expectations of both 
agents. A comes to expect that B will perform some action p, and B in turn 
expects that A will perform some action q. These are what Lewis calls first-
order expectations. From these first order expectations together with the 
assumptions they make about each other's rationality, background 
information, desires, etc., A and B come to have what Lewis calls higher-
order expectations. A expects that B will come to expect that A will 
perform q, and B expects that A will come to expect that B will perform p. 
A then expects B to expect that A will come to expect that B will perform 
p, and B also expects A to expect that B will come to expect that A will 
perform q. These expectations may be present in the agent's deliberations 
up to about the fourth order, although in principle there is no upper 
bound. Neither A nor B have the same first or higher order expectations, 
but there is a sense in which the higher the order of the expectations 
which A and B have the greater is their common understanding and 
agreement of the facts in the matter. A will then come to act in a manner 
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consistent with both what he expects B to do and what he expects B to 
expect that he will do, and B will come to act in an analogous fashion. The 
more information about one another which is shared by the agents in a 
coordination problem, the higher the order of expectations that will 
develop and, consequently, the greater will be their chance of solving their 
coordination problem. 
Lewis ment ions 6 three factors which when present in the state of 
affairs involving agents in a coordination problem are particularly effective 
in producing a 'system of mutual concordent expectations' among those 
agents. If all the participants take part in an agreement, then, provided 
everyone has good reason to believe that everyone else will abide by the 
agreement, each of them will develop strong expectations regarding the 
other's future actions. If somehow, perhaps by chance, a group has solved 
their past coordination problem by achieving conformity to some 
regularity, then this situation may have set a precedent in which there is 
now a tendency, which is mutually recognized among all participants, for 
everyone to attempt to solve similar coordination problems in the future 
by achieving conformity to the same, or similar, regularity. Agents may 
also come to have strong mutual expectations by recognizing (and 
realizing that other recognize, etc.) one possible regularity as being 
particularly salient due to its 'naturalness', convenience, or whatever. 
What is it that is common to states of affairs in which a system of 
mutual concordant expectations is produced and that can account for 
their production? Lewis contends that there are three conditions any state 
of affairs A must meet in order for it to generate higher order 
expectations. If what is meant by a sentence of the form 'A indicates to x 
that p' is that if x should have reason to believe that A holds then x would 
thereby have reason to believe that p, then the three conditions can be 
stated as follows (where P is any population and p is any proposition or 
propositional content). 
(1) Everyone in P has reason to believe that A holds. 
(2) A indicates to everyone in P that everyone in P has reason to 
believe that A holds. 
(3) A indicates to everyone in P that (p) . 7 
If these three conditions are satisfied by some A then, for a particular p, it 
may be said that it is common knowledge in P that p. An A meeting all the 
conditions is then sufficient to satisfy among the members of P any higher 
order expectation about p given that the members of P make mutual 
assumptions regarding each other's rationality, inductive standards, and 
'Convention, pp. 33-41. 
Ibid, pg. 56. 
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so forth. A provides the particular content for the belief in p among the 
members of P , 8 and that's its role in the production of the complex of 
expectations. States of affairs characterized by the factors of agreement, 
precedence, o r salience often provide that content and hence satisfy 
conditions (1H3) . 
With the establ ished notions of a coordinat ion problem, a 
coordination equilibrium and common knowledge, Lewis advances the 
following definition of a convention. 9 
A regularity R in the behavior of members of a population P 
when they are agents in a recurrent situation S is a convention if and 
only if it is true that, and is common knowledge in P that, in any 
instance of S among members of P, 
(1) everyone conforms to R; 
(2) everyone expects everyone to conform to R; 
(3) everyone prefers to conform to R on condition that 
the others do, since S is a coordination problem and 
uni form conformi ty to R is a coordinat ion 
equilibrium in S . 1 0 
Lewis notes that agents may be involved in a convention and not 
realize that it is a convention inasmuch as 1, the knowledge that the 
regularity has features which make it fit the definition may never be 
realized but remain 'potential' knowledge, and 2, the knowledge about the 
regularity or the recurrent situation may not be verbal but be derived 
from immediate empirical assessments of the situation, and 3, the 
knowledge the agent has may be limited to the behavior of individuals 
taken one at a time within a particular instance of the recurrent situation 
without the associated recognition of a general pattern of conformity to a 
regularity. 
However, Lewis finds it necessary to modify the above definition of a 
convention. He docs not wish to rule out recurrent situations that consist 
of a scries of interrelated problems of interdependent decision none ol 
which considered by themselves is a true coordination problem. For 
example, each competing merchant in a community may set prices in the 
short run so as to maximize his own profits at the expense of the others, 
but, since all price changes are always soon reflected in the prices set by 
all the merchants, none of the merchants stands to gain in the long run. 
8 O r as Lewis puts it, A is the basis in P for common knowledge thai p. 
^This is actually Lewis's second, although his first more refined, formulation 
of ihe definition of a convention. Lewis abandons his first definition in 
favor of ihe following account since an essential feature of a convention was 
lcfl out: a conventional regularity must be the result of a system of mutually 
concordant higher order expectations produced as a result of a basis for 
common knowledge in the population of agents. 
^Convention, pg. 58. 
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and, consequently, the merchants in the long run collectively either 
succeed in setting prices at adequate levels or fail to do so and go out of 
business. Each interdependent pricing decision is not when considered by 
itself in the short run a coordination problem, but the entire scries of such 
pricing decisions made by all the merchants over an appropriate period 
of time does constitute a coordination problem. As long as .the series 
consists of problems in which coordination of interests predominates and 
the whole series when considered together is a coordination problem, the 
recurrent situation, in this case a series of recurrent interrelated events, is 
an appropriate S in the above definition. 
In order to avoid a difficulty, an example of which will be discussed 
later, a restriction, though, must be placed upon S, regardles of whether S 
is a self contained coordination problem or is a series of situations only the 
whole of which is a coordination problem, in the form of a requirement 
that agent's payoffs for each particular combination of actions be the 
same or nearly so so that the coordination problem is at least 
approximately a game of pure coordination. What this in turn means is 
that each agent prefers that everyone conform to R given that at least all 
but one (whether himself or someone else) conforms to R. Since 
associated with any actual convention there must be at least one other 
possible convention which could have been established (in order for the 
actual convention to be in a sense arbitrary), S must also be a coordination 
problem that contains a least one other coordination equilibrium which 
corresponds to another possible convention R' such that R and R' are 
incompatible (in the sense that conforming to both R and R' is 
impossible). The other possible convention R* must, of course, satisfy all 
the conditions placed upon R except (1) and (2). 
In the final modification, Lewis amends his definition of a convention 
to allow for cases in which not all the members of P conform to the 
regularity in every instance of S. The final, less quantitative, definition of 
the two that he presents near the end of the second chapter is as follows. 
A regularity R in the behavior of members of a population P when 
they are agents in a recurrent situation S is a convention if and 
only if it is true that, and it is common knowledge in P that, in 
almost any instance of S among members of P, 
(1) almost everyone conforms to R; 
(2) almost everyone expects almost everyone else to 
conform to R; 
(3) almost everyone has approximately the same 
preference regarding all possible combinations of 
actions; 
(4) almost everyone prefers that any one more conform 
to R, on condition that almost everyone conform to 
R; 
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(5) almost everyone would prefer that any one more 
conform to R', on condition that almost everyone 
conform to R'; 
where R' is some possible regularity in the behavior of members 
of P in S, such that almost no one in almost any instance of S 
among members of P could conform both to R' and to R . 1 1 
What Lewis endeavors to accomplish with the modifications to his 
original definition I think can be seen more clearly when depicted in 
terms of S's payoff matrix. By requiring that, directly or indirectly, S be a 
game of pure coordination, that S contain another coordination 
equilibrium which could have given rise to a different convention, and 
that each agent prefers that everyone conform to R given that..., Lewis is in 
effect stipulating that for any R which may be a convention R corresponds 
to some coordination equilibrium on a standard form matrix that is a 
payoff matrix for S . 1 2 By a 'standard form matrix', I refer to a matrix, such 
as the one in figure 4, in which 1, the payoffs in each particular square are 
the same, either all zeros or all ones and 2, there is a scries of two or more 
squares that contain non-zero payoffs along one of the matrix's main 
diagonals. 
(C) 
1 2 3 
3 
. 1 o 0 o 0 
o 0 o 0 o 0 
o 0 o 0 1 1 
Figure 4 
The squares with non-zero payoffs represent combinations of actions 
which are in conformity to some possible convention R, and the squares 
with zero payoffs represent combinations of actions in which either one or 
both of the agents is not in conformity with any possible convention R. No 
square of the matrix represents any combination of actions in conformity 
with more than one possible convention R. In the matrix of figure 4, (1,1) is 
1 1 Ibid, pg. 78. 
l^S's payoff matrix may be one that can he put into standard form by linear 
rescaling. This rescaling is accomplished by multiplying all the payoffs in 
every square by some constant and then addding some constant to all the 
products. 
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a combination of actions in conformity with a possible convention R t , and 
(3,3) is a combination of actions in conformity with a possible convention 
K?;all other combinations of actions arc in conformity with neither R j nor 
K 2. 
In order to see why S must be a game that is at least very similar to a 
game of pure coordination, consider the matrix of figure 5 . 
(C) 
1 2 3 
1 6 
6 o 5 0 0 
( R ) 2 5 0 5 ' 9 6 2 0 
3 0 0 2 0 6 5 
5 
Figure 5 
(2,3) and (1,1) are proper coordination equilibria, so the matrix is a payoff 
matrix for a coordination problem. Suppose that R-chooser has convinced 
C-chooser that R is going to do 2 and that C believes this and has good 
reason to believe it given R's apparent integrity and the fact that the 
problem has been solved previously by R's doing 2. Suppose R believes 
that C is most likely going to do 3;R certainly has good reason to believe 
this given C s payoff at (2,3) and R's belief that C believes R intends to do 
2. Higher order expectations could very well be produced in both R and C, 
and yet R has deceived C in leading him to believe that R intends to do 2. 
R then reasons that, since C is going to act based upon his belief in what R 
intends to do, C is most likely to do either 2 or 3 and since the difference in 
C"s payoffs between (2,2) and (2,3) is slight and C will want to avoid the 
zero outcomes at (1,3) and (3,1) C may well opt to do 2, instead of three, 
and thereby guarantee that his outcome will be 5 or greater. If he does, R's 
payoff will be much improved if R does three since R's payoffs at (2,2) and 
(2,3,) arc much less than they are at (3,2). R then chooses to do 3 , and, as a 
result, regardless of how C chooses, a non-coordination equilibrium is 
reached. The trouble with the situation represented by the payoff matrix is 
that although it is a coordination problem it contains a degree of conflict: 
C s best outcome occurs at (2,3), a coordination equilibrium, while R's best 
outcome occurs at (3,2), not a coordination equilibrium. This type of 
problem is ruled out as a possible recurrent situation S by the 
requirement that in every square in the payoff matrix the payoffs for each 
agent be nearly the same. 
There arc in Lewis's analysis of convention a few considerations he 
has not adequately taken into account. Firstly, in cases where a conformity 
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to a regularity is not initiated by its salience, how is it possible for a 
precedent to be set? (An agreement cannot really be said to initiate a 
conventional regularity since an agreement is, by itself, no assurance of 
future conformity inasmuch as it represents no guarantee that the agents 
involved have any better knowledge of what each other is likely to d o 
unless it is connected with past behavior which sets a precedent.) If the 
agents just happen to solve the initial coordination problem by sheer luck, 
then they will all probably realize it was a coincidence and will not in 
general display a tendency to repeat the behavior. Secondly, when, and 
under what conditions, may it be said of a population that its members are 
no longer party to a convention? In principle, an instance of the recurrent 
situation S may not be present to any of the members of P at some timc(s) 
and yet the convention has not been violated at any time and remains in 
effect. A group of jurors is still party to the convention of language even 
though there are times when its members must remain silent. For Lewis, a 
convention, once established, is self perpetuating in that past conformity 
to R leads to current expectations among members of P that conformity 
to R will continue in the future which in turn ensures their present 
conformity to R which then will serve as a basis for their future 
expectations that conformity to R will be maintained which in turn ensures 
their future conformity to R. How then do the members of a population 
faced with the continuing need to coordinate their actions succeed in 
discontinuing a prior convention and adopting a new one if a convention, 
once establ ished, is self perpetuating as long as the desire for 
coordination persists? Thirdly, is it really true to say that conventions are 
maintained by a self .perpetuating system of mutual concordent 
expectations? In other words, just how seriously do we need to take Lewis's 
claim that conventional regularities arc established and maintained by 
such expectations on the part of the parties involved? Must all, or most, of 
the agents literally have these expectations, or must it only be the case 
that such a pattern of expectations could in principle be produced by the 
deliberations of all the agents? It would seem, in some cases at least, that 
when a conventional regularity was first established the participants did 
have expectations concerning everyone's future conformity, since it was 
pertinent at that time for everyone to give consideration to the issue of his 
conformity, but that after the regularity was well established people were 
conditioned to conform and responded out of mere habit. It seems, for 
instance, that among experienced American drivers who are sober the 
issue of their driving on the right side of the road is not an issue they give 
even a second thought to and continue the practice by force of habit. On 
Lewis's account, then, driving on the right side is not a convention since it 
is not reinforced by any reasoning on the part of the agents involved, but 
this exclusion seems both arbitrary and counter-intuitive. 
There may also be a more fundamental difficulty in Lewis's account 
of the origins of conventional regularities. Exactly how docs precedence 
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1 \Scc Davidson's essay, "Communication and Convention," in Inquiries into 
Truth and Interpretation (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1985). 
work to develop the mutual expectations of the agents? The factors of 
agreement and precedence would appear to be insignificant unless each 
agent involved in a coordination. problem presupposed of one another 
that a behavior pattern once displayed would be repeated by each agent 
in the future. The particular behavior pattern would have allowed the 
agents to solve the coordination problem in the past and conforming to it 
in the future would be the very convention that supposedly is just now 
being established. Lewis's account here seems to beg the question in that 
his explanation requires the explanandum in the explanans. 
Lewis's formal treatment of the notion of a convention has succeeded 
in making explicit the general idea that conventions, on the one hand, are 
in an important sense arbitrary and yet, on the other hand, the 
continuation of a conventional practice is essential to the well being of all 
involved. It is still a question, however, whether or not Lewis's notion of a 
convention, and of a conventional signaling system, can account for 
linguistic meaning. Donald Davidson has a r g u e d 1 3 that such an account 
of convention will only explain in what sense language use among 
members of a community is conventionally governed and will not account 
for language meaning. The members of a speech community, due to their 
participation in a linguistic convention, will expect (and expect that others 
will expect...) that expressions with the same or similar meaning will be 
uttered under similar circumstances to bring about the same or similar 
intended effect in an audience. 
